This afternoon I started a
journey down the rabbit hole, this journey stated after a conversation with an
individual who had a past association with several DOD program management
offices and hearing some of the stories associated with these programs they
were the managers, I sat on the other side of the table as a contractor.
The question came up as to just how much a
F-35 the new hope for manned combat aircraft for the United States Air Force,
the United States Navy, and the United States Marine Corp airframe cost the
Department of Defense.
This individual was quick to
quote the latest flyaway cost, the actual cost to build that airframe. I asked is that really how you should
calculate the cost? I asked what about
all of the R&D cost associated with the program that had been accumulated
and still are accumulating? Their
response was to forget about it after all they were sunk cost, which sent a
chill through me. My experience in developing
commercial products where the cost of development for my company came from cash
flow and loans told me a different story.
These “sunk” development cost are typically quite sizeable in comparison
to the actual production cost of the individual item, and that they have to
be accounted for and eventually recovered through the sale of the end product,
after all we hopefully are a profit making enterprise. I foolish asked that since they had been
associated with this program (for abet a short period) did they have an idea of
amount of these costs? Their response
was that it was unknown to them.
This was quite a shock, and if
this individual mindset were anywhere typical of the personnel in the program
management office, then that would go a long way to explain the predicament of
the project. Note this is not to be
critical of any individuals they have to operate and advance within the rules
of the system that is the Department of Defense. It is more of an indictment of the United
States Congress for allowing it and the Department of Defense for perpetuating
it, because in the end it is after all OPM (Other Peoples Money).
Military personnel are
transient in their career ladders, never allowed to sit in any one billet for
any extended period, never really allowed to master any single program or
task. The continuity is typically
provided by the DOD civil service employee, however typically the ones that
stay for any extended period in a program office have little if any real authority
to effect change in a program, and those civil service employee that do have
any real authority are typically quickly moving on to other slots.
My First step into the Abyss
was a staggering in that it took at least an hour to find reliable detailed
sources of data, and that is a story for another day. But once the sources were found (typically
Volume 2 RDT&E), one might expect that everything would be easy after that
point, boy was that was a mistake.
The next step trying to make
headway into the data was worse than the first step. The data had to be extracted from various DOD
budget documents (in this case USAF since they are the lead agency for the
program), and various locations in these documents, along with several format
changes, and in many cases the grand totals of actual expenditures for a given
year had to calculate since they were not presented in the documents. Additionally
the various actual expenditures had to be computed several times in that next
year budget document would provide revised actual expenditure from previous years. For some unexplained reason the Department of
Air Force could not added up expenditures, especially if they contain expenditures
by other services or countries.
Due to my eyes glazing over and
the headache that was building I decided not to aggregate cost of the F-35
program that exist in other parts of the Department of the Air Force budgets,
like the Operations and Maintenance Budget, and Military Construction Budget,
and in other weapon development program budgets (for example the Small Diameter
Munitions program, but there are F-35 program cost in other program budgets)
If I did not know better I
might suspect that some elements in the DOD, the Congress, and the contractors
might be trying to hide something, but that could not be true, not in our
Democracy. Our elected representative
and the individual that are appointed to positions in the Department of Defense
both civilian and military are all honorable individual with no hidden private
agendas or vested personal interests in these programs.
Well here are the results of
one afternoon of scrounging around the DOD Budgets and it is not pretty. First the data, for the full effect I decided
to presented the data with all of the associated with digits, that way one can
see just how large the numbers are.
The DOD repots typically record
the numbers either in terms of Thousands or Millions of Dollars. I think that it is done in an attempt to keep
the appearance of the numbers small that way individuals who are just casually looking
will not realize just how large they are and continue on their merry way none
the wiser.
Before I get to the numbers
that I could find, as a side note the cumulative spending (actual and planned)
on the F-35 program if it were a nation would place it number 55 on the IMF nominal
GDP list of 184 countries, and number 51 on the World Banks nominal GDP list of
190 countries, and finally number 51 on the United Nations List of nominal GDP
list of 193 countries.
F-35 program actual and
projected expenditures to date would exceed the nominal GDP of some 70 percent
of the nations of the world. We, and our
allies have either spent or plan to spend a great deal of money on this weapon
system that at the end of the day become one hell of a revenue stream and
profit center for the Lockheed Martin Company.
Year
|
Incremental Spend
|
Cumulative Spend
|
1997
|
$636,173,000.00
|
$636,173,000.00
|
1998
|
$982,121,000.00
|
$1,618,294,000.00
|
1999
|
$982,023,000.00
|
$2,600,317,000.00
|
2000
|
$522,896,000.00
|
$3,123,213,000.00
|
2001
|
$684,831,000.00
|
$3,808,044,000.00
|
2002
|
$1,751,359,000.00
|
$5,559,403,000.00
|
2003
|
$3,824,210,000.00
|
$9,383,613,000.00
|
2004
|
$4,888,973,000.00
|
$14,272,586,000.00
|
2005
|
$4,921,949,000.00
|
$19,194,535,000.00
|
2006
|
$5,254,418,000.00
|
$24,448,953,000.00
|
2007
|
$4,997,965,000.00
|
$29,446,918,000.00
|
2008
|
$4,335,332,000.00
|
$33,782,250,000.00
|
2009
|
$6,445,317,000.00
|
$40,227,567,000.00
|
2010
|
$9,966,172,000.00
|
$50,193,739,000.00
|
2011
|
$12,916,401,000.00
|
$63,110,140,000.00
|
2012
|
$9,818,342,000.00
|
$72,928,482,000.00
|
2013
|
$12,862,345,000.00
|
$85,790,827,000.00
|
2014
|
$16,056,597,000.00
|
$101,847,424,000.00
|
2015
|
$20,318,908,000.00
|
$122,166,332,000.00
|
2016
|
$22,266,345,000.00
|
$144,432,677,000.00
|
Table 1
These
numbers are astonishing in their size.
The sheer magnitude should be mind-boggling.
For those who are more visually inclined is a
graph of the data in table 1.
The
DOD is big on talking about flyaway costs, partly I suspect is that sticker
shock might kill if not maim members of the Congress and more importantly the
taxpayers of the United States.
Theoretically
flyaway cost are the costs associated with actually building the airframe, and
just forgetting any other accumulated program cost, after all those costs are
sunk.
As of this writing the DOD is
estimating that the flyaway cost for an airframe at 150 Million Dollars, and is
estimated to fall to 100 Million Dollars (assuming 2443 airframes).
Just a side note in 1996 DOD projected the
flyaway cost at 35 Million Dollars per airframe.
F-22A flyaway costs have been reported at
142.7 Million Dollars per airframe based 187 airframes.
Flyaway cost is a red herring it is designed
to keep your eye off the true cost of airframe.
You
and I paid those cost and they do matter.
Projected airframe cost for 215 airframes that the DOD is anticipating
to have built by 2016 would bring the average cost per airframe to
$671,779,893.02 Dollars each, 672 Million Dollars each. That is a great deal of money to spend for an
airframe, especially one that is expected to go into harms way. Table 2 displays the cost of airframes based
on cumulative program costs.
The
first F-35’s (all two of them) cost the United States Government and the other
participants at least $14,723,459,000.00 each for the first two airframes, for
those who do not like to count up all the digits that is 14.7 Billion
Dollars. This is just an estimate in
that I could not easily find program expenditures prior 1997.
Airframe
|
Dollars
|
2
|
$14,723,459,000.00
|
8
|
$4,222,781,250.00
|
15
|
$2,681,837,800.00
|
25
|
$2,007,749,560.00
|
50
|
$1,262,202,800.00
|
68
|
$1,072,477,676.47
|
87
|
$986,101,459.77
|
119
|
$855,860,705.88
|
167
|
$731,534,922.16
|
215
|
$671,779,893.02
|
Table 2
Below
is a graph of the data in Table 2.
It would
take the production of a great many airframes to get the cost down to point
where the average cost of an airframe get under 500 Billion Dollars per
airframe, and it is very likely that the cost of the airframe would never get
below 250 Billion Dollars per airframe, given that there is current projected
fly away cost for airframes are being advertised as 150 to 167 Million Dollars.
Well
so much for this installment of the deal of the century. The funds that we have spent to date on this
program are lost. But the funds that are
currently planned to be spent can be saved and might actually make a small dent
in our ever-expanding national debt.
This just in the JSF/F-35 Program office announced late in the afternoon 30 November that they have just reached an agreement with Lockheed Martin on the "Flyaway Cost" for the next batch of airframes (32) and will sign the contract modification for some $4,400,000,000.00 Dollars also know as 4.4 Billion Dollars sometime in the next few weeks. This is part of the allocated 12.8 Billion for FY 2013. Why the big hurry, committed funds via contract or contract mod are not subject to sequestration. We are taking care of the elephants, they will have enough food and water to weather the coming storm, and the ever-expanding national debt just keeps rolling on to the sea.